To Alexander Bain, · on James Ferrier's “Institutes of Metaphysic.”
Dear Bain,—I thought Ferrier's book quite sui generis when I first read it…
To Alexander Bain,
on James Ferrier's “Institutes of Metaphysic.”
Blackheath Park, 13th February 1863.
Dear Bain,—I thought Ferrier's book quite sui generis when I first read it, and I think so more than ever after reading it again. His system is one of pure scepticism very skilfully clothed in dogmatic language. To find the meaning of any of his propositions one is obliged to invert it—to turn it, as it were, bottom upwards, and discover the purely negative underside, of which the side turned towards the spectator is but the superficial outcome, and which negative underside contains all the reality there is in the proposition. For example, matter, according to him, is the only variable element in cognition. But he avers that neither the world at large nor thinkers, when they discussed the subject of matter, ever imagined that they were affirming or denying the existence of a variable element in cognition. Consequently the entire purport of Ferrier's proposition is, that if matter is not this, “there is nothing else for it to be” (to use an expression of his own). Again, the whole of his doctrine of the Absolute may be thus expressed: Unless the Absolute is what I say it is, that is, unless a toothache, regarded as my toothache, is the Absolute there is no Absolute. This
[p. 285]1863
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Aetat. 56.
strikes me as very cool in a thinker whose doctrines are of this character, to class other people as sceptics and present his own system as the first and only real safeguard against scepticism. The truth is, it outdoes in scepticism almost all the systems so called, inasmuch as it abolishes noumena. According to it there are no “ things in themselves”; they have no locus standi anywhere, not even in Herbert Spencer's region of the Unknowable. To this doctrine I have little to object, but I do object in toto to the mode in which it is arrived at. For the only legitimate mode of arriving at it is by the psychology of which he thinks he can never speak too scornfully—viz., by pointing out the genesis, through ascertained laws of the mind, of the belief that people have that they do perceive, or have evidence of things in themselves. Until this is done this next to universal belief is primâ facie evidence of its own truth, just as the impressions of the senses are. All such attempts, however, he repudiates, rebuking philosophers in general for commencing their study of the mind with the origin of an idea, and not seeing the very obvious truth (which it will be one of the purposes of what I write on Hamilton to enforce) that since we cannot observe the first moments of human consciousness, a theory of the genesis of our notions is an indispensable condition of ascertaining what those are which we possess originally. Despising this instrument of investigation which he does not know how to use, he arrives at all his conclusions, without one single exception that I remember—certainly at all those which he declares to be of primary importance—either by deduction from arbitrary definitions or by reasoning in a circle. How, for example, does he prove the doctrine which he considers it his greatest feat to have established, the principal proposition of the Agnoiology ?1 By arguing that, as ignorance is a defect, there can be no ignorance but of things which might possibly be known. He erects the accidental dyslogistic connotation of a word into the chief constituent of its meaning, and from this definition of his own concludes
[p. 286]1863
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Aetat. 56.
that there are no other things to be ignorant of, and not (which is the only valid conclusion) that if there are we may be ignorant of them without blame. His general mode of settling the questions which divide philosophers is to transfer the names of the things, real or unreal, which they contend about to things the reality of which nobody ever thought of contesting ; after which, as there are no names left for the things which people do contest, the conclusion is quietly slid into that there are no such things. I do not in the least dispute that if this negative conclusion be true, there is much to be said for transferring the existing words with all their associations from nonentities to the realities which are the proper objects for those associations ; and what makes me to a certain extent tolerant of the book is that I think philosophy will most likely ultimately use the words in something like his sense of them, so that his system serves as a mode of stating a connected set of opinions grounded in truth, which connected statement he mistakes for deducing them from one another. But the fact that there is anything else for the words to mean has to be proved first, which cannot be done by begging it in the definitions of the terms. What, again, can be a more glaring paralogism than that by which he establishes his grand proposition that certain supposed laws of our cognitions are necessary laws of all cognition existing, possible or imaginary, finite or infinite ? It all rests upon a double meaning of the word contradictory. He lays down as a principle that what is contradictory cannot be known, not merely by our intelligence but by any intelligence. He gets this admitted by presenting it as if it meant that our intelligence cannot believe that a thing is and also that it is not. So presented, the reader is not unwilling to admit that the impossibility does not arise from the limitation of our intelligence, but is a law of all intelligence. But when the time comes for drawing the consequences of the admission, the Contradictory is found to be that which contradicts not itself, but “the necessary laws of cognition,” and from that time forward anything
[p. 287]1863
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Aetat. 56.
which we cannot, as the author expresses it, “conceive to be conceivable” is placed on that ground among things unknowable by any, even infinite, intelligence, though it may not involve any self-contradiction at all. Thus the proposition that the human capacities of conception (in their second power at least) are a measure of the possibilities of universal intelligence steals in as a demonstrated truth without having been once faced.
Then how strangely absurd are his representations of other writers, above all his romance about Plato. There has been plenty of nonsense written about Plato’s Ideas, but I did not expect to be told that what Plato means by them (though he failed to express his meaning distinctly) was the Ego! This wonderful conclusion seems to be reached by the following syllogism. The Ego is (according to my system) the universal element in cognition—Plato’s Ideas were the universal element in cognition; therefore Plato’s Ideas were the Ego. How Plato would have stared at this interpretation of what he conceived as the very opposite pole, the point furthest removed from (and raised above) the Ego, of all the elements which enter into the generation of Knowledge!
In spite of all this, however, and of the flourishing of trumpets which accompanies every fresh paralogism or disguised assumption, one cannot help being struck in almost every page with the ability of the writer, though I cannot think that it lies in the direction of metaphysical speculation. And the book, like all books by persons of talent on difficult subjects of thought, helps to clear up one’s own ideas. . . .
Notes
- 1[Theory of ignorance.]
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.



