To J. Stuart Glennie.
Dear Sir,—Dr. Tyndall’s answer to your question must be considered, I should think…
To J. Stuart Glennie.
Blackheath Park, 23rd July 1863.
Dear Sir,—Dr. Tyndall’s answer to your question must be considered, I should think, to set at rest all doubt respecting the complete establishment of the law of Conservation of Force so far as regards the mutual convertibility of heat and mechanical motion. Though the law is not
[p. 297]1863
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Aetat. 57.
yet similarly established in any other of its sub-divisions, there is good reason to expect that it will be so, and I am quite willing to accept it hypothetically as established.
Supposing this mutual convertibility to be a universal law it will necessarily modify, at least in the mode of expression, much of the received physical and metaphysical philosophy; and in endeavouring, even in the present state of the subject, to discover what these modifications ought to be, you are engaged not only in a useful undertaking, but in one for which the letter you have written to me shows that you have a considerable qualification. I would therefore encourage you to go on, and as the best help I can give you is to offer such remarks as occur to me on any part of your speculations which you may communicate to me, I will begin doing so with your letter.
With regard to Matter, there has long been a growing tendency in thinkers to regard its particles as mere centres of force — even as local centres arbitrarily assumed to facilitate calculation and not implying the hypothesis of an absolute minimum. I think also that philosophers have long since given up the conception of inertia in the sense in which you contend against it. No one any longer speaks of a vis inertiæ, sufficient of itself to neutralise part of an impelling force. It is quite understood that as much force as is lost by the impinging body is always transferred to the impinged, at least in the form of pressure, and that if this is often imperceptible to the senses it is because a small amount of force is distributed over so great a bulk that the effect on the whole is that of an inappreciable fraction. We may now add, as the complement and correction of this, that force which is lost as motion, reappears in some other shape. With respect to Cause, I confess that I cannot see that the philosophical conception of it is at all altered by the new principle. The existence of force, no doubt, must now be placed as the existence of matter was before, among those facts which, having in their nature no beginning, are not dependent on any cause. The existence of a certain quantity of force, as of a certain quantity of matter, becomes itself one of the primeval causes. But
[p. 298]1863
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Aetat. 57.
every change of state, from one manifestation of force to another (as from locomotion to heat and conversely), remains an event, dependent on a certain combination of previous conditions, and our conception of Causation is still, in regard to such events, exactly what it was before. Not to mention that the ultimate effects which follow from these different manifestations—e.g., the locomotion which we see, and the heat which we feel—remain essentially and irrevocably different as they were before. They are shown indeed to be consequences of the same Primeval Cause, under different acts of collateral conditions: but neither this, nor anything else, can make them identical in themselves; the sensations are different, and do not co-exist as the causes do; they are effects dependent, as they have always been considered to be, upon a law of sequence.
The mutuality of action, of which the range is so greatly extended by the discovery of the Conservation of Force, does not, as it seems to me, affect the idea of Cause. Even if established as the universal law of all action, it would only show that all, instead of merely some, Causes are reacted upon by their effects; that there is reciprocal succession between the different links of two series. This phenomenon is always allowed for in the inductive theory of Cause. It is always recognised, for example, in the phenomena of gravitation. The present position of every body in the solar system is the joint effect of the position of all the other bodies of the system, and it also itself exerts an influence on the position of each of them. But this is still a case of succession, not of co-existence, for only one of these relative positions of all the bodies can exist at a time, and the change from one position to another is effected by motion which is successive. If the position of each body were merely a fact in co-relation with the position of every other, all the different positions mutually determining one another, the system would be in equilibrium and all motion would cease. That it does not cease proves that the present position of each body is determining not the present position of every other, but a change in that position. So that even in this example
[p. 299](the most favourable of all to you because gravitation has not been proved to require time for its transmission) you need the old idea of Causation to account for the facts.
1863
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Aetat. 57.
I may add that if a different definition is now wanted of Cause and Effect it would be necessary to look out for clearer expressions than “a relation” and the “realisation” of that relation: terms which, as it seems to me, require explanation still more than Cause and Effect do.
I shall always be happy to discuss these matters further with you either by word of mouth or in writing.
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.



