To Sir John M‘Neill, · on James Ferrier’s work “ Institutes of Metaphysic.”
My dear Sir,—I have been unable to answer earlier your note of the 10th of last month…
To Sir John M‘Neill,
on James Ferrier’s work “ Institutes of Metaphysic.”
Torquay, 5th December 1854.
My dear Sir,—I have been unable to answer earlier your note of the 10th of last month, having only found time to read the book you were so kind as to send me during a few days passed at this place before going abroad for the winter.
Mr. Ferrier has the rare merit in a controversialist of complete fairness. He understands the opinions of all the opponents, whom he notices as fully, and states them as clearly and forcibly as his own. He has a very telling mode of discussion. His fabric of speculation is so effectively constructed, and imposing, that it almost ranks as a work of art. It is the romance of logic.
I should be very happy if I could add that I believed it had done what the author is firmly persuaded it has—solved the problem which all philosophers from the first origin of speculation have been vainly hammering at. On the contrary, it is depressing to me to see a man of so much capacity under what appears to me so deep a delusion. Truly the main hindrance of philosophy is not its intrinsic difficulties, great as they are, but the extreme rarity of men who can reason. It is enough to make one despair of speculation when a man of so much talent and knowledge as this book displays, and who piques himself peculiarly on his reasoning faculty, commits nearly every fallacy set down in books of logic, and this at all the most critical points of his argument. He says, that whoever admits his first proposition must admit all the rest. I do not admit his first proposition; but even if I did, his first great paralogism, as it seems to me, consists in thinking that his second proposition follows
[p. 185]1854
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Aetat. 48.
from his first, and there is a similar, or a still greater logical blunder each time that he makes any really fresh advance in his argument. The whole system is one great specimen of reasoning in a circle. Unless each successive conclusion is presupposed, it is impossible to admit the premisses in the sense in which alone they can support it. All this I am satisfied I could prove to you, book in hand, in an hour's conversation. Before I had finished the book I understood his mode of proceeding so well that I could generally see beforehand in what manner he was going to beg the next question. The effect is most disheartening, for when a writer who can so well point out the fallacies of others builds an entire system of philosophy paralogising, what confidence is it possible to feel in avoiding them, and how vain seems all hope that one has done, or can do, anything to help these subjects forward. The only thing which alleviates this discouragement is the belief that the author was, from the first, on a wrong tack—as all metaphysicians in my opinion will be, until they leave off revolving in the eternal round of Descartes and Spinoza (of the former of whom this book continually reminds me), and cease to imagine that philosophy can be founded on “necessary truths of reason,” or, indeed, that there are such things as necessary truths—any, at least, which can be known to be necessary in the metaphysical sense of the word.
Pray excuse the seeming crudity with which I have expressed the opinion you asked from me—it has not been crudely formed.
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.

